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 Executive Summary 
 
I have already and repeatedly joined other voices in noting the virtual expulsion of the 
entrepreneur from the contemporary mainstream literature of economics. I have also joined the 
call for the restoration of the entrepreneurs’ place in the theory, given the fact that no one seems 
to deny their importance for the workings of the free-market economy in general and for its 
growth and innovation in particular. Here, I begin by offering my own explanations for the 
entrepreneur’s exclusion. More important, I hope to show how inventors and entrepreneurs can 
be restored to their proper place in production and distribution theory and actually take first steps 
toward realization of that objective.  
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Entrepreneurship And Invention: Toward Their Microeconomic Value Theory 
 
William J. Baumol  
 
1. Introduction  
I have already and repeatedly joined other voices in noting the virtual expulsion of the 
entrepreneur from the contemporary mainstream literature of economics. I have also joined the 
call for the restoration of the entrepreneurs’ place in the theory, given the fact that no one seems 
to deny their importance for the workings of the free-market economy in general and for its 
growth and innovation in particular. Here, I begin by offering my own explanations for the 
entrepreneur’s exclusion. More important, I hope to show how inventors and entrepreneurs can 
be restored to their proper place in production and distribution theory and actually take first steps 
toward realization of that objective. I will offer theory that undertakes to explain inventors’ and 
entrepreneurs’ activities, that analyzes their remuneration and shows that discriminatory pricing 
is a normal state of affairs in this arena, even in the classic Schumpeterian model. The model on 
which the analysis focuses is not just applicable to the entrepreneurs—rather, it deals with a 
considerably broader arena in pricing and distribution theory. But I do claim that, as a particular 
application, it deals with the pricing and remuneration of entrepreneurs and so, perhaps largely 
for the first time, brings us toward incorporation of this fourth factor of production into 
established value theory. 
Here, I will be dealing throughout with innovative rather that what I have called 
“replicative” entrepreneurs, that is, with those who launch a firm with the aid of a new product or 
some other innovation rather than opening a company similar to a multitude of previously started 
enterprises. And I will argue that in a wide range of cases competitive market forces make those 
who conduct innovative activities into discriminatory price takers and that the vector of 
discriminatory prices that the supplier of innovation is forced to adopt will, if competitive 
pressures are sufficiently strong, tend to be Ramsey-optimal. Furthermore, I will argue that this 
state of affairs fits right in with the Schumpeterian model, in which, however, the discrimination 
entails prices that differ over time, rather than differing among submarkets, as occurs in common 
models of differential pricing. But the noteworthy observation here is that the formal analysis of   2
intra-temporal and inter-temporal price discrimination in terms of differences in elasticities of 
demand is just the same. 
The theory offered here also rests on the fact that much of today’s innovative activity is 
carried out by the economy’s giant corporations, although, contrary to Schumpeter’s prediction, 
this has not marginalized the role of the independent entrepreneur. I will argue that what has 
happened, rather, is that the two have taken on complementary roles, with each undertaking a 
critical portion of the economy’s innovative activity. I will also show, beginning with the large-
firm contribution, that the two have very analogous formal value theory analyses. That is, the 
appropriate pricing models applicable to the two types of innovative enterprise are very similar 
in formal structure.   
To create a systematic microanalysis, it will be necessary to discuss the supply of the 
innovative activities of both groups as well as the equilibrium pricing structures to which they 
are driven by market forces. Of course, at least in the case of the independent inventors and 
entrepreneurs, being self-employed and self-appointed to their occupations, the ordinary sort of 
analysis of the demand for their services will not apply. 
    
2. Why the Entrepreneur has been Exiled from Standard Microeconomic Theory  
There are, actually, at least two very good reasons why the entrepreneur is virtually never 
mentioned in modern theory of the firm and distribution. The first, and less significant, reason is 
summed up in what I call “Baumol’s Third Tautology: Innovation is an entirely heterogeneous 
output.” Production of whatever was an invention yesterday is mere repetition today. So, in an 
analysis of entrepreneurial activities, there are none of the homogeneous elements that lend 
themselves to formal mathematical description, let alone the formal optimization analysis that is 
the foundation of the bulk of microeconomic theory.  
The more critical explanation of the absence of the entrepreneur is that in mainstream 
economics the theory is generally composed of equilibrium models in which, structurally, 
nothing is changing. But, this excludes the entrepreneur by definition. She is absent from such a 
model because she does not belong there. This has been definitively argued by Joseph A. 
Schumpeter (1911) and Israel M. Kirzner (1979) who have demonstrated that sustained 
equilibrium is something that the entrepreneur does not tolerate, any more than she tolerates 
sustained disequilibrium. Here, Schumpeter's key insight is that the entrepreneur's occupation is   3
the search for profitable opportunities to upset any equilibrium. That is exactly what any 
innovation, in the broadest sense, entails. But the rest of the story is told by Kirzner, who 
recounts that the entrepreneur, with his critical ability—alertness—recognizes in any 
disequilibrium a profitable arbitrage opportunity and, by taking advantage of that opportunity, he 
provides the pressures that move the economy back toward an equilibrium condition. So the job 
of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is to destroy all equilibria, while Kirzner’s works to restore them. 
This is the mechanism underlying continuous industrial evolution and revolution, and it is surely 
not the stuff of which stationary models are built. Thus, it should hardly be surprising that a 
stationary Walrasian model, even in a more sophisticated variant, has no room for the 
entrepreneur. 
This is particularly evident of the standard theory of the firm, which analyzes the 
repetitious decisions of an enterprise that is already present and fully grown. In such a scenario, 
the entrepreneur has already completed his job and left for other places where his firm-creation 
activities can be used. Even if the creator of the firm has not departed, he has transformed his 
role from entrepreneur to manager, so that although he, himself, remains in place, the 
entrepreneur has gone. 
I conclude that the neoclassical theory is not wrong in excluding the entrepreneur, 
because it is dealing with subjects for which he is irrelevant. It would, in my view, be as 
indefensible to require all microeconomic writing to give pride of place to the entrepreneur as to 
exclude him universally. But that does not mean that no theory of entrepreneurship is needed. 
Universal exclusion condemns us to leave out of our discussions what I consider to be the most 
critical issues that should be examined (although not exclusively) in microeconomic terms: the 
determinants of innovation and growth and the means by which they can be preserved and 
stimulated. We have left in the hands of the economic historians what I regard as the greatest and 
most important mystery that economics faces: Why have the free-market economies in the past 
two centuries been able to outstrip, probably by more than an order of magnitude, the 
performance in terms of growth and innovation of all other forms of economic organization?   
 
3. Division of Innovative Tasks between Small and Large Firms 
Much of the discussion that follows emphasizes the difference between the innovative 
roles of small and relatively new enterprises and large established firms that operate in high-tech   4
oligopolistic markets. Elsewhere I have provided striking evidence indicating that private 
innovative activity has been divided by market forces between small firms and large, with each 
tending to specialize in a different part of the task (Baumol, 2002a). Even though the 
preponderance of private expenditure on research and development (R&D) is provided by the 
giant business enterprises, a critical share of the innovative breakthroughs of recent centuries has 
been contributed by firms of very modest size. These radical inventions then have been sold, 
leased or otherwise put into the hands of the giant companies, which have then proceeded to 
develop them—adding capacity, reliability, user-friendliness and marketability more generally—
to turn them into the novel consumer products that have transformed the way we live. I have 
referred to this division of labor as the “David-Goliath partnership,” the value of whose 
combined contributions clearly exceed the sum of the parts. 
To the extent that the facts confirm this characterization, it is clear that the small 
enterprises have made and continue to make a critical contribution to the market economies' 
unprecedented growth and innovation accomplishments. Without breakthroughs such as the 
airplane, FM radio and the personal computer, all introduced by small firms or individuals 
working independently, life in the industrialized economies would be very different today. 
Moreover, without these breakthrough inventions to work upon, the big companies would not 
have the items upon which to confer their improvements, each of which by itself, is unexciting, 
but when accumulated can constitute enormous advances. This is typified by the evolution of the 
Wright brothers’ primitive aircraft into the Boeing 777 or the steady improvement of the 
computer chip, whose computational speed has grown over three decades by some 3 million 
percent. This incremental innovation by the large firms is typically carried out in a routinized and 
bureaucratic manner, sedulously avoiding the great risks entailed in pursuit of breakthrough 
inventions, with management often deciding not only the R&D budget and personnel, but even 
determining what the R&D division should next seek to invent. 
1  
My objective here is to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the activities of the 
small firm and the large innovative concern and, in particular, with the structure of their pricing 
                                                 
1 This story is evidently consistent with a Booz Allen, Hamilton study of “…1000 publicly held companies around 
the world that spent the most on R&D in 2004” that reported  that the odds of success“..increase when senior 
management makes sure that there is clear customer demand [for the innovation to be worked upon] and a profitable 
way to bring the innovation to market before any project gets the go-ahead.” (New York Times December 24, 2005, 
p. C5.  
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and remuneration relative to their innovative activities and prices, to see how these can be fitted 
directly into mainstream value and distribution theory. We will see that a central part of the story 
is centered around discriminatory pricing, with the contention that the pertinent competitive 
market forces do not merely permit such prices, but actually force the firm to adopt them and 
dictate what those prices must be. This is all in contrast with the more usual contention that 
discriminatory prices cannot be adopted by the firm unless it possesses monopoly or market 
power. I will argue that this ain’t necessarily so and that, on the contrary, in a wide variety of 
instances it is the very presence of effective competition that forces discriminatory prices upon 
the firm.  
In summary, the second proposition of this paper asserts that in a broad range of market 
types and conditions akin to those assumed in elementary economics textbooks—i.e., where 
entry is unimpeded, where consumers can be separated into distinct groups with different 
demand elasticities, and where the market's commodity cannot easily be resold by one group to 
another—market pressures will prevent any equilibrium for the large innovative firm in which 
the product price is uniform. Not only will each such firm be forced to adopt discriminatory 
prices, but it is likely to be forced to adopt an approximation to a unique vector of prices each 
dictated by the market. Thus, in this paper I will seek to show why price discrimination may 
occur, and occur frequently, not despite competitiveness of the market, but because of it. In fact, 
I will show that, in highly competitive markets, firms may have no choice:  Competition can 
force them to adopt the vector of profit-maximizing discriminatory prices. For different reasons 
and in a different pattern, a variant of this pricing pattern will hold both for the small 
entrepreneurial enterprises and the large innovative enterprises engaged in oligopolistic 
competition.  
Moreover, in the third central proposition of the paper, I will argue that in equilibrium 
these discriminatory prices are not haphazard in their welfare properties but that they will 
generally constitute a Ramsey optimum—satisfying the second-best welfare attributes of 
revenue-constrained economic welfare. And as a corollary, it will be asserted that, unless 
marginal-cost pricing of all of the firm’s products yields zero economic prices, uniform pricing 
must be incompatible with welfare maximization. 
It may be noted, incidentally, that none of these conclusions means that all firms that 
employ discriminatory prices can automatically to be taken to possess no monopoly power and   6
should therefore be exempted from regulation. But it does imply the converse: Such firms should 
not automatically be deemed appropriate objects of regulatory oversight. 
 
4. Oligopolistic “Red-Queen” Innovation Games and Mandatory Price Discrimination 
Elsewhere (Baumol, 2002, especially Chapter 3), I have described the R&D activities of 
the oligopoly firms in the high-tech industries of the developed economies as an “arms race.” 
Following Schumpeter, I emphasized that these firms now regard such things as price to be 
weapons of secondary importance in their competitive battles. The primary weapon has clearly 
become the new or improved product that these firms race to introduce before a rival can bring to 
market an alternative that is equally or more attractive to consumers. No firm in this position 
dares to fall behind in the race to create new and better products, because protracted failure to do 
so can be fatal. And, in analogy with the description provided by Lewis Carroll’s Red Queen, 
each firm finds itself running as fast as it can in order to stand still, in terms of its position in the 
market. I maintain that this Red-Queen-game feature of the market is a key attribute of the 
advanced economies that helps to account for their continuing outpouring of innovations. It is 
evidently far more powerful than just a high monetary reward, because mere accumulation of 
riches allows the recipient to rest on his laurels and withdraw from further innovative activity. 
But an innovation arms race permits no rest, lest competitors outperform and thereby kill off the 
enterprise of anyone who is inactive.     
It is noteworthy that this incredibly effective and, indeed, ingenious arrangement is yet 
another product of the market mechanism, not consciously invented, designed or imposed by any 
person or group. Unlike the other developments that underlie the growth performance of the free 
market, which I have ascribed largely to historical accident, the Red-Queen-game attribute of the 
innovation process is automatically introduced by oligopolistic competition and is therefore yet 
another of the contributions of the market mechanism itself. 
  The pertinence of these last observations to our analysis can be summed up in three 
observations: First, the oligopolistic high-tech firm finds itself unable to avoid frequent and 
substantial reinvestment in R&D, without which it cannot survive, but it also cannot survive if its 
pricing approach precludes recoupment of those outlays.  Second, relative ease of entry into the 
innovation process condemns the firm to expect to earn near-zero economic profits, but with the 
opportunity to recoup the repeatedly sunk R&D outlays, because entry will not occur with any   7
lower level of earnings. Third, because an outlay is increased by an expansion in the number of 
customers for its products, none of this R&D expense will enter marginal cost, so that marginal-
cost pricing will generally not be viable for such an enterprise. 
But before dealing with the pricing issues that face the innovative oligopolists, I will 
consider what can be said about their R&D financing supply decisions, that is, about the amount 
of expenditure on innovation to which they will be driven by market forces. 
 
5. A Kinked-Revenue-Curve Model of Spending on Innovation 
    I have argued elsewhere
2 that because of relative ease of entry, competitive markets, on 
average can be expected to offer little economic profit return to the R&D outlays of the 
innovating oligopolies. Yet market forces leave them no choice. If firms do not keep up with 
competitors in terms of product attractiveness and improved process efficiency that lowers costs, 
they will lose out to their rivals and end up losing money. Clearly, firms are driven to keep up 
their R&D spending by an understandable preference for zero economic profits—profits that 
yield only normal competitive returns to investors—over negative profits, investor flight and 
insolvency. 
    We can make the technological scenario more explicit with the help of a microeconomic 
model very similar to the old kinked-demand-curve model that has been proposed to explain why 
prices tend to be “sticky” in oligopoly markets. The underlying mechanism in that model, of 
course, is an asymmetry in the firm’s expectations about its competitors. The firm hesitates to 
lower its price for fear that its rivals will match the price cut, so that the firm will end up with 
only a few new customers, but with dramatically reduced revenues. On the other hand, it fears 
that if it increases its price, the others will not follow suit, so that it will be left all by itself with 
an overpriced product. A firm with such beliefs will want to set its price at the industry level, no 
more and no less, and leave it there unless the competitive situation changes drastically. 
    The innovation story is similar. Thus, consider an industry with, say, five firms of 
roughly equal size. Company X sees that each of the other firms spends about $20 million a year 
on R&D. It will not dare to spend much less than $20 million on its own R&D because, if it does 
                                                 
2 Baumol (2002). There, I cite evidence (p. 40 fn) that, on average and taking account of both the spectacular 
successes and spectacular failures, the earnings of all computer-related activities together have yielded something 
close to the normal (competitive) rate of profit.   8
so, its next product model may lack new features as attractive as those of rival products. On the 
other hand, Company X sees little point in raising the ante to, say, $30 million because it knows 






  The story is described graphically in Figure 1, which shows an MC curve and two MR curves. 
For simplicity, I have drawn the MC curve as a straight line. The MR curves, however, reflect 
two possible competitor responses. If each time Company X expands its spending, its rivals do 
the same, then any improvements in X’s product are likely to face comparable competitive 
products. Thus, the MR resulting from X’s enhanced R&D will be quite low (curve mAr), 
because Company X will fail to pull ahead of its rivals. On the other hand, if competitors let X 
increase its R&D spending without increasing their own, then X can expect its increased product 
quality to put it well ahead of the others. So its MR from R&D spending will be relatively high 
(curve MCR). 
    Now suppose Company X expects mixed reactions from its competitors: They will follow 
its lead in increasing R&D, but will not follow any decreases. The result is the Z-shaped curve, 
MCAr, in Figure 1 with a vertical break between points A and C at the current level of R&D 
investment ($20 million in the example). The explanation is simple: If each firm in the industry   9
spends $20 million a year, and Company X were suddenly to decrease R&D spending—say, to 
$7 million per year—it has good reason to fear that competitors would not match that cut. With 
its relative product quality declining (because it is spending so much less on R&D) and no 
competitor’s product doing so (because competitors are still spending $20 million), Company X 
can expect to lose a good deal of revenue. It will find itself moving backward along the “not 
matched” MR curve MCR, to point S. However, if Company X decides to increase its R&D 
spending above $20 million, it will not gain much revenue (it will move along the low 
“matched” MR curve mAr), because its rivals will feel threatened and will match the increase. 
3 
    But that is not the end of the story. All the firms in the industry will continue to invest the 
same amount until one of them enjoys a research breakthrough leading to a new product that 
threatens to capture the bulk of the market. That fortunate firm will then expand its investment in 
the breakthrough product, because doing so will pay off even if the other firms in the industry 
match the increase. Thus the MR curve for the breakthrough firm will move to the right, as will 
its MC = MR point, to an amount larger than $20 million. This rightward shift in the company’s 
Z-shaped marginal revenue curve is depicted in Figure 2 as the movement from M1B1R1 to 
M2B2R2. Other companies in the industry will follow to some degree. So now the industry norm 
will no longer be a $20 million annual investment but some larger amount, say, $25 million per 
firm. No firm will dare drop back to the old $20 million level, fearing that its rivals would not 
follow such a retrenchment move. So the MR = MC equilibrium point will now be B2, at $25 
million of R&D spending. Again, the common story of armaments races among countries 
parallels the story of innovation battles among firms. 
 
                                                 
3 This story is evidently consistent with the Booz Allen, Hamilton study of  the 1000 biggest R&D spenders firms in 
the world in 2004 that was cited in footnote 2, above ” that reported  “ While ‘spending more does not necessarily 





         The process just described shows how competition forces firms in the industry to keep up 
with one another in their R&D investment. But once they have caught up, the investment level 
remains fairly constant until one firm breaks ranks and increases its spending. Then, all the other 
firms follow suit. Such an arrangement can be described as a ratchet, in analogy to the 
mechanical device that prevents a wound-up spring from suddenly unwinding. This arrangement 
normally holds technological spending steady, sometimes permits it to move forward, but 
generally does not allow it to retreat. Thus, we can expect R&D spending to expand from time to 
time.  But once the new level is reached, the ratchet—enforced by the competitive market—
prevents firms from retreating to the previous lower level.




                                                 
4 This statement somewhat exaggerates the effectiveness of the ratchets in preventing the economy from ever sliding 
backward in its R&D expenditures.  After all, even in machinery ratchets sometimes slip.  Firms may, for example, 
be forced to cut back their R&D expenditure if business is extremely bad. Or they can simply make mistakes in 
planning how much to spend on investment, or they may be discouraged by repeated failures of their research 
division to come up with saleable products.  The economy’s ratchets are indeed imperfect, but they are there.  They 
cannot completely prevent backsliding in R&D expenditure, but they can be a powerful influence that is effective in 
resisting such retreats.    11
Proposition 1. Supply of R&D financing in the innovation arms races of oligopolists.   
Oligopolistic competition with innovation as the primary weapon forces firms to adhere 
to the industry standard of R&D expenditure, with occasional rises in that norm. 
    Such ratcheting acts as a critical part of the mechanism that produces the extraordinary 
growth records of free-enterprise economies and differentiates them from all other known 
economic systems. Competitive pressures force firms to run as fast as they can in the innovation 
race just to keep up with the others. 
  
The Second Central Proposition:  
Mandatory Price Discrimination in Separable Markets without Entry Barriers. 
Next, I return to the pricing issues that arise in the innovations arms race of the high-tech 
oligopoly industries where, it will be argued next, price discrimination is the normal state of 
affairs. The analysis of the competitive-discriminatory price mechanism can apply to many 
industries and their activities but, for the reasons just discussed, it is particularly applicable to 
large-firm innovation. The analysis of the purely theoretical side of the issue rests on only four 
assumptions about the pertinent markets:   
1.  Firms can enter and exit at low cost and with little delay, doing so whenever 
there are profits to be earned. Such a market is one I have elsewhere dubbed 
“contestable.” There, barriers to entry in the Stigler sense are zero and 
equilibrium profits must also be zero.  
2.  Customers can be divided into different groups with differing demand 
elasticities (e.g., students, senior citizens), constituting different submarkets 
with negatively sloping demand curves for the firm. 
3.  If members of one such group are offered a pertinent product at a lower price 
than that available to the members of another group, it is not feasible for the 
former to resell their purchases to the latter.
5   
                                                 
5 Of course, in reality such segmentation of customers incurs costs that are often substantial, although there are other 
cases in which it is easy and almost automatic (e.g., student or senior citizen discounts for theater admission). Where 
the cost of segmentation is significant, it is possible to construct a model to determine the profit-maximizing level of 
such expenditure by the firm, but this complication is ignored here because it distracts us from the center points.   12
4.  The average cost curves of the firms should be roughly U-shaped, at least in 
the relevant portion of the loci. This last premise is needed to ensure the 
existence of a discriminatory equilibrium that is stable and competitive.  
 
  The second and third premises are, of course, the standard assumptions underlying any 
model of price discrimination. In addition, it will be assumed throughout that the cost and 
demand conditions in the pertinent market are such as to result in existence of an equilibrium that 
is unique. The first assumption—zero entry barriers and entry whenever profits are available in a 
market—is, of course, an extreme case. Indeed, interpreted strictly, it rules out sunk costs, for the 
need to incur such costs does indeed constitute a barrier to entry, imposing risk costs upon the 
entrant from which the incumbent is immune. 
But the sunk costs that are important for us are not once-and-for-all outlays. Rather, they 
are continuing expenses typified by the competitive requirement that the firm in a high-tech 
industry budget continuous outlays that must repeatedly be sunk in R&D.
6 As we know, in such 
an industry, a firm that has once introduced a superior product or a more-efficient production 
process cannot afford to rest on its oars. For it knows that it is engaged in a kind of arms race 
with its rivals, with expenditure on further innovation the prime weapon, and success in the race 
ultimately a matter of life and death.   
The sunk costs that are said by traditional theory not to matter for an incumbent firm’s 
decisions, but do constitute barriers for the potential entrant, are the once-and-for-all 
expenditures made by the incumbent in the past and not repeated thereafter, but are not yet 
incurred by the potential entrant. For the old firm these are the ancient history that no current 
decision can change, whereas the sunk outlays that the firm must be expected to recoup, and on 
which the analysis here focuses, are those that are incurred currently and will repeatedly be sunk 
again for the foreseeable future. It is these expectable and recurring sunk outlays that most 
directly drive the firm to discriminatory pricing. And it is crucial to recognize that they are not 
barriers to entry in Stigler’s pertinent sense, because they are equal burdens for the entrants and 
                                                 
6 It must be admitted that the high-tech industries do not seem to have been nearly as successful as the airlines in 
differentiating their prices among customers. Still, extensive school and student discounts for computers and 
software and negotiated terms with large corporate purchasers are examples in which the sellers do what they can to 
employ discriminatory prices.    13
the incumbents. That is, they offer no substantial competitive advantage and, hence, no 
monopoly power to an incumbent firm. 
    Aside from the premises just described, no further restrictions are required for my 
central result. Nothing need be assumed about the magnitudes of fixed and variable costs or the 
presence or absence of the former, so long as those costs, although fixed, are not sunk once and 
for all. There is no need for additional restrictions upon the nature of demand, or the ability of 
firms to operate in more than a single market, or their ability to limit the quantities of output they 
can offer at a given price (since restricted output can, if profitable, be replaced by a rival’s entry). 
Even in the absence of any such assumptions, other than those listed above, we have the result 
 
Proposition 2.  Entry enforces discrimination.   
    In a market with no barriers to entry, the firm’s equilibrium economic profits will be 
zero. But if, in addition, a seller can separate its customers into distinct submarkets with different 
demand elasticities of the firm’s submarket demand curves, and the firm can prevent its product 
from being transferred from one customer to another, the normal assumptions of the theory of the 
firm will require discriminatory prices if losses are to be avoided, so that equilibrium will entail 
such prices. 
Proof of the proposition follows directly from the basic assumptions listed above. As will 
be emphasized in the next section, all of them are quite familiar and appear widely in the 
literature, including even the elementary textbooks.
7 It should be noted however, that the 
assumed differences among demand elasticities in the different submarkets preclude perfect 
competition, with its universally horizontal supplier demand curves. 
It should immediately be clear, intuitively, that the first three of our four assumptions 
yield Proposition 2. For if the market conditions require the firm to charge its profit-maximizing 
prices in order to break even, and those prices permit it to do so, then those are the prices it will 
be forced to select in equilibrium. But if there exist discriminatory prices that yield profits higher 
than those that are possible under uniform pricing, it then follows that the (zero profit) 
equilibrium profit-maximizing prices must be discriminatory. Moreover, if the maximum is 
unique, the firm will be a price taker, with a unique vector of discriminatory prices, dictated   14
element by element by the market. However, it should be noted that we have so far not made use 
of the fourth premise, the U-shaped average costs, which we will need to consider for the 
existence and stability of the competitive, discriminatory equilibrium. 
 
6. Existence and Stability: Need Entry Undercut Discriminatory Prices, and Can 
Discriminators Coexist? 
 
The preceding arguments can be expected to raise at least two questions in the reader’s 
mind. First, will not the easy entry, whose frequency in reality we have already noted, force 
prices toward uniformity?  Second, there is the other side of the matter. Will not the 
discriminating firm be able to take over the market and evolve into a monopolist?  The general 
answer to both questions is that in some circumstances either can happen, but not in the situation 
described by our model. These questions also draw our attention to the issue of existence and 
uniqueness of the discriminatory equilibrium, an issue that will not be examined formally here, 
but that will be dealt with intuitively.   
To deal with all this most directly and intuitively, I will next go over the workings of the 
model with the aid of some simple diagrams. To avoid complications, I assume that there are two 
customer groups, each with downward-sloping and linear demand curves, pi = AR = ai – biyi (I = 
1, 2). Hence, their marginal revenue will also be linear, with twice the slope of the demand 
curves, as shown in Figures 3(a) and 1(b) for submarkets (customer groups) 1 and 2, 
respectively. As usual, to find the profit-maximizing decisions for the firm as a function of its 
total output in the two submarkets, we add the marginal revenue curves horizontally, to obtain 
the kinked marginal revenue curve for the firm as a whole since, as we know, profit 
maximization at any given output level of the discriminating firm requires marginal revenue in 
the two markets to be equal.  We obtain the familiar kinked marginal revenue curve of Figure 
3(c). At low levels of total output y = y1 + y2, the firm serves only the more lucrative submarket, 
market 1 (the submarket which, at low volumes, offers a higher marginal revenue than is offered 
by the other submarket at any output level). But once the amount of output sold in market 1 
becomes sufficiently large, say at  
                                                                                                                                                             
7 The proposition is foreshadowed by the Baumol, Bailey, Willig weak-invisible-hand theorem, which asserts that, in 
a monopoly market that is perfectly contestable, the discriminatory Ramsey prices are sustainable against entry (see 






Figure 3  
y = y*, it will pay to supply some amount of product to submarket 2. From the marginal revenue 
curve for the two submarkets together we can derive a curve of average revenue for the firm as a 
function of its total output, and on the assumption that the price in each submarket is set so as to 
maximize the total revenue derived from that level of y. To the left of y* the firm’s average 
revenue curve will have the usual relationship to submarket 1’s MR curve, both starting at the 
same point and MR having twice the downward slope of AR. But at y* the firm’s average 
revenue curve has a downward discontinuity at y*, as shown, because at higher values of y the 
firm obtains part of its revenue from a submarket with lower average returns than the initially-  16
served submarket, thereby reducing the average of the returns from the two sources together. 
Thereafter, to the right of y*, the average revenue curve will be linear with a slope that is 
intermediate between those of the AR curves of the two submarkets.   
Now, suppose that the average cost curve for the combined market is as shown by ACm, 
part of which lies below the market AR locus, as in Figure 3(c). Then it is clear that in the 
absence of barriers, as assumed in our model, we can expect entry to occur. As in the usual story, 
the result will be a downward (leftward) shift in one or both of the submarket demand curves, 
which will proceed to the point of tangency, T,  between the AR and the AC curves, if such a 
point exists [Figure 3(f)].
8 Thus, if the curvatures of the average cost and revenue loci are 
appropriate, there will only be one such tangency point at a unique output level, y**, and at any 
other output level the firm will incur losses.  
 Figure 4 shows total revenue and cost in the circumstance described in Figure 3(f). With 
the demand curves linear of the form AR = a – by, the total revenue curves will satisfy TR = ay + 
by
2. So they will be parabolic, as shown by curves 0TR1 and 0TR2.  As before, when total output 
is small, it will pay the firm to serve only submarket 1, so the total revenue curve for the firm 
will coincide with that for this submarket. Moving to the right, to larger values of y, we reach a 
point where the slope of 0TR1 equals that of 0TR2 , meaning that marginal revenues in the two 
submarkets are equal at these points and there it will pay the firm to begin to supply some of its 
product to submarket 2. From that point onward, the firm’s TR locus will lie above the OTR1 
parabola to the locus labeled RS.
9  The figure also shows an illustrative total cost curve and its 
tangency point, E, with this TR curve. E will evidently be the equilibrium point corresponding to 
that in Figure 3(f). 
                                                 
8 In Figure 3, for illustration, the AC curve is evidently that for a total cost that is entirely fixed, and provides an 
absolutely limited capacity to the firm. However, it should be clear that none of the discussion depends on that 
premise. 
 
9 Such a heightening of the TR curve will also occur under uniform pricing when the firm begins to serve submarket 
2, but the heightened curve will only begin at a level of y greater than that under discriminatory pricing, and the 
uniform-price heightened curve segment will generally lie below that under discriminatory pricing. The second 
assertion follows from the superior profitability of discriminatory pricing when the cost function is given. In the 
linear case, the earlier rise in the total revenue curve under discrimination is also easily shown. Using the equations 
from above, we see that the equations of the marginal revenue curves are of the form MR = a – 2by, that the vertical 
axis intercept of the submarket 2 AR curve is evidently a2 and its slope at that axis is also a2 so that with a uniform 
price the firm will begin to serve submarket 2 when the price in submarket 1 reaches a2, which will occur when a2 = 
a1 –b1y1 or y1 = (a1 – a2)/b1. But under discriminatory pricing, submarket 2 will begin to be served when submarket 




The observation from the two diagrams that is most important to us is that in the situation 
with which our model deals, at any output other than the equilibrium output at the tangency point 
in either Figure 3(f) or Figure 4, the firm will lose money and be unable to survive. This is where 
our fourth assumption, the U-shaped average cost curve for the firm, comes into play. It will be 
seen from the diagrams that with the lineal demand curves in the firm’s submarkets, this is 
sufficient to produce that result, though it is not necessary. What is required, clearly, is that the 
curvature (convexity) of the AC curve be greater than that of the AR curve, and that the former 
contain a downward sloping segment whose slope (if continuous) decreases in absolute value as 
y increases from a level initially higher than that of the corresponding point on the total market 
AR locus, and that finally the slope of AC exceed that of AR.  
We are now in a position to answer the two questions posed at the beginning of this 
section. First, we see that there is nothing in our equilibrium analysis that precludes the existence 
of a multiplicity of firms that compete in the markets in question. The nature of the cost and 
demand relationships is such that it prevents expansion of the firm’s output level above the 
equilibrium amount. Consequently, total market demand for the product may well be many times 
as large as the equilibrium output of our firm. This means that there can coexist a plurality of 
such firms with similar demands, costs and equilibrium outputs, and that can constitute industry 
equilibrium and can be stable.   18
Similar reasoning suggests that in such an equilibrium it will not be possible for the 
discriminatory pricing to be undermined by “cream-skimming” entry that attacks only the most 
lucrative segments of the overall market. For in the circumstances depicted in the graphs, any 
firm with the same revenue and cost possibilities will incur losses by serving only one market. It 
follows that, even with the competitive pressures that characterize a market with absolute 
freedom of entry and exit, there need be no force that drives prices toward uniformity. The 
argument suggests that while successful entry into our industry is possible, at least in the unique 
equilibrium case, it will only be an entrant opening for business fully grown to the equilibrium 
output who will be able to survive. Of course, reality is somewhat different from that, and a few 
words will be said about this presently.  
We can conclude this part of the discussion with a few remarks on the implications of the 
discussion for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium with discriminatory prices. What has 
been shown here indicates that with little more added (such as continuity of the relevant portions 
of the derivatives of the AC and AR loci), we can expect such an equilibrium to exist. 
Uniqueness, however, is a bit more complex.  Aside from the obvious possibility of a 
multiplicity of tangency points, made implausible by the U-shaped AC curve assumption, there 
is another complication. Along with the discriminatory-price equilibrium, there may coexist an 
equilibrium with uniform prices.  Suppose, for example, that the firm has substantial fixed and 
sunk costs, that there exist two submarket for the firm’s product with profit maximizing prices p1 
> p2 and that the firm’s uniform-price AR curve cuts its AC curve at price p < p1. Then p will be 
an equilibrium uniform price for the firm, that prevents entry via its fixed costs and zero profits. 
But while that can indeed be a second equilibrium, and one with uniform prices, it is difficult to 
see why the firm will not take advantage of the opportunity to charge the profit-maximizing 
discriminatory pricing, that will only enhance its earnings temporarily, but that is surely better 
than nothing. Once the discriminatory price equilibrium has been attained, the profit will be 
eroded more or less gradually by the threat of entry, and it is difficult to see how the uniform-
pricing equilibrium will again come into play. 
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7: Discriminatory Price Makers or Price Takers? 
There are, of course, firms with monopoly power and some of them do charge 
discriminatory prices that yield monopoly profits. But where entry is sufficiently easy, as we 
have seen, discrimination brings no such profits. More than that, ease of entry deprives the firm 
of choice in the setting of prices. 
The reason for this should now be easy to see. For this purpose, we need only consider 
the likelihood that, in practice, the profit-maximizing price vector for the firm will be unique. If 
that is so, where that price vector and no other yields zero profits, the firm will have no choice. 
Any enduring deviation from that vector must be suicidal. The firm will, effectively, be a price 
taker, though not one that follows a posted price that emerges publicly on a market such as that 
for, say, pork bellies.
10 
This is not mere theory. In practice, we see marginally surviving firms scrambling for 
every perceived source of potential revenue, and adopting for every such source the price they 
believe necessary to capture that revenue. Neither the impecunious theater nor the marginal 
airline can tolerate empty seats. Each seeks desperately to fill them with whoever can help its 
finances—students, leisure travelers and others who are unwilling to pay high prices, but who 
will pay a price that contributes something in addition to marginal cost. Similarly, that airline 
cannot forgo the higher price it can impose on business travelers who book at the last minute, for 
without their contribution to total cost recovery the firm’s financial problems will be 
exacerbated. To the best of their ability, they will select the prices that promise to maximize 
profits, that is, to minimize losses. Experience may well enable them to come close to selection 
of those most lucrative prices and, if they do not succeed in this, they will be replaced by others 
who can do so more effectively. 
Thus, market forces impose selection of approximations to the profit-maximizing 
discriminatory prices. The profit-seeking firm that charges a lower price to union members or to 
older customers does not do so out of charity but because market conditions force it to do so in 
order to survive. And the supplier firm that charges higher prices for its product when it is sold in 
                                                 
 
10 Because, so far, only the price-taker side of the firm’s activities has been discussed, there is little room for insights 
from game theory. However, we will see presently that there is more to the story because the market’s equilibria are 
vulnerable to constant disturbance.   20
the United States than when it is sold in Africa is equally forced to do so. In particular, the 
airlines that charge higher fares on routes served by few other carriers are not manifesting a 
monopolist’s ability to select an exploitative price. Of course, one cannot doubt that they would 
want to adopt such lucrative prices if entry was difficult and those prices could bring in 
substantial economic profits. But even if that were not so, entry would still force them to adopt 
such prices, whose magnitude is dictated by the rule that maximum profits are zero profits. 
Discriminatory pricing is not a sign of a breakdown of contestability but rather a manifestation of 
its normal functioning. If the constraint on profit imposed by entry is potent, the only way for the 
firm with large fixed and continuing sunk costs to survive will be actually to engage in price 
discrimination of the most sophisticated variety that is workable. And only the firm that is more 
efficient in finding and carrying out better pricing strategies will survive against less creative 
firms. 
The bottom line here is that, where entry is easy, price discrimination is not to be taken as 
a manifestation of monopoly power.
11 It is true that a monopolist may well also be able to engage 
in this practice and, if it is feasible, the monopolist will generally prefer to do so. But in 
effectively competitive markets the same type of prices can be expected to emerge, and emerge 
as a mandate of the market throughout the industry. The firm that charges discriminatory prices 
in such an environment is, effectively, a price taker, not a price maker, because there is no 
substantial range of prices among which management can select. Rather, it is the need to survive 
that makes those selections, selections that may well be unique. 
Two things need to be said here to adapt this conclusion to reality. First, as has already 
been noted, in markets of the sort in question it is not unusual for prices to change frequently, 
indeed, sometimes with astonishing frequency. The fact that the airlines adopt hundreds of 
thousands of price changes every day can well elicit skepticism about the assertion that the firms 
have little choice about the prices they adopt. Yet it should be noted that in the most competitive 
of markets, the commodity and the securities exchanges, price change is virtually continuous, 
varying from moment to moment, yet no one is led by this to suspect that a relatively small 
wheat farmer is really a price maker. Indeed, it is mostly in industries where there is reason to 
                                                 
11 On this point, I have my only disagreement with Hausman and Mackie-Mason’s excellent and illuminating article, 
when they speak of,  “…the necessary monopoly power for price discrimination to take place” (1988, p. 245 fn). For 
the origin of the argument that discriminatory pricing need not require monopoly power, see Levine (2002). 
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suspect that the firms possess market power that prices tend to persist unchanged, often for many 
months. Sticky prices are not a hallmark of industries in which pricing is controlled by the 
market. 
Here, however, I must not exaggerate. Unlike a farmer or a purchaser of stocks, the 
executives in charge of pricing in an airline cannot communicate with any organized market 
electronically to determine what fares current circumstances impose. These people must 
constantly do their best to determine the current profit-maximizing prices for their firm, but at 
best they do so very imperfectly. They do not have access to current demand functions for their 
products or even a set of accurate demand functions for some time in the past. Neither they, nor 
anyone else, know their marginal costs or even their average costs, as is confirmed dramatically 
by examination of the records of any substantial antitrust trial in which predatory pricing is an 
issue. In these trials, in the absence of the pertinent cost data in the records of the firms, 
specialists on both sides are commonly employed at great expense to determine their own greatly 
differing and admittedly imperfectly-accurate cost estimates. Given the unavailability of the 
requisite information and the speed with which the firm finds it necessary to respond to changing 
market conditions, the prices selected will at b est be rather imperfect approximations to the 
profit-maximizing prices toward which they are driven by market pressures. But that is still very 
different from the leisurely and considered pricing choices available to the firm that is really a 
price maker, protected by lack of competition from having to obey the dictates that emanate from 
a powerful market. 
 
8: Ramsey Optimality of the Price Taker’s Discriminatory Prices 
I come next to my third central result: 
Proposition 3. Ramsey Optimality.  
If the profit-maximizing equilibrium that yields zero profit with discriminatory pricing is 
unique, then it is a Ramsey optimum. 
That is, the equilibrium will entail the vector of prices that is Pareto optimal, subject to 
the constraint that the (expected) economic profits of the firm (and the industry) are zero. The 
argument is almost trivial. If this is the only set of prices that satisfies the zero-profit   22
requirement, then there can be no other prices that satisfy that constraint and add to consumers’ 
plus producers’ surplus, or that benefit some individuals without harming anyone. That must be 
so simply because any other price vector, whether better or worse, will violate the constraint. 
That is all there is to the argument. However, we can do a little better than this, deriving the 
requirements for the equilibrium and showing that they lead to the usual Ramsey formulas. For 
simplicity,  I deal with the case where the marginal costs of serving consumers in the different 
submarkets are all the same and equal to C’, while the demands of the different submarkets are 
independent, so that all cross elasticities of demand are zero. Then, using obvious notation, 
equilibrium requires 
(1)    Max  Σ piyi – C(y1,…,yn)  
Subject to  
(2)     Σ piyi – C(y1,…,yn) = k (where we will select k = 0).  The Lagrangian is 
(3)      L = (1+r) [Σ piyi – C(y1,…yn)] – rk, where r is the Lagrange multiplier. 
But the first-order conditions for maximization of (3) obviously include 
(4)      (1+ r) [1 + (yi/pi) dpi/dyi ] = (1+ r) pi [ 1 – 1/E] = (1+r) C’ or   
(5)       (pi – C’)/ pi = 1/E, 
which is, of course, the most elementary form of Ramsey equation. 
 
9: Ramsey Optimality of the Price Taker’s Discriminatory Prices 
But what about the independent inventors and their entrepreneur partners?
12 Can a similar 
story be told for them? The answer, although it may at first not be obvious, is that this is 
precisely what the Schumpeterian scenario already has told us. Only it has done so in a manner 
that disguises the price discrimination side of the story, which in formal terms exactly follows 
what was just offered for the large established enterprises. However, what is entailed in 
Schumpeter can be better described as intertemporal price discrimination. It will be recalled that 
                                                 
12 Here I follow Schumpeter in not distinguishing between inventors and innovating entrepreneurs. We can think of 
the inventor who is also his own entrepreneur, and seeks to market his intellectual property by himself, as in Thomas 
Edison’s case. Or, instead, we can think of the inventor as a partner of the entrepreneur, as James Watt was 
associated with Matthew Bolton.   23
in essence in that scenario the entrepreneur and inventor make their profits and recoup their 
outlays of money and effort in the initial period after the introduction of an innovation when 
competition is weak or nonexistent, so the seller’s demand curve is inelastic and the profit-
maximizing price is high. But as imitators appear, the initial seller’s demand curve grows more 
elastic and that price consequently falls. It should be obvious that there is no difference between 
the formal analysis of the discrimination among customer groups described in the preceding 
sections and the discrimination among time periods described by Schumpeter. In particular, there 
is no reason for Propositions 2 and 3 to be any less applicable to Schumpeter’s model.  Thus, in 
this respect, the analysis of the independent entrepreneur’s pricing under market pressures is 
structurally similar to that of the innovative oligopoly firm.  
 I turn next to the supply side of the independent entrepreneurs and inventors. Here I will 
focus on three mechanisms that characterize the relation between the market and the 
entrepreneurial firm. They can be suggestively referred to as: (1) the superstar reward structure; 
(2) the psychic rewards to innovative activity; and (3) the scarcity and cost disadvantage of 
large-firm competition in the arena of breakthrough innovation. I will presently discuss each of 
these in turn. But, first, let me offer an observation that relates to them all. As is to be expected, I 
will find that the market does provide clear incentives for entrepreneurs to undertake the hazards 
of radical innovation. But, paradoxically, I will find that each of the three mechanisms we will 
discuss entails financial underpayment of the average innovative entrepreneur. That is, it entails 
the expectation of financial returns lower than those to corporate employees with similar 
education and experience who provide comparable efforts.   
  A few preliminary words must also be said to avoid misunderstanding of just what it is 
that is to be explained. It is not my hypothesis that a large percentage of entrepreneurs employ 
innovation in the new firms they create. On the contrary, the evidence, imperfect though it is, 
suggests that most new firms are virtual replicas of many firms already in existence, and there is 
nothing innovative about them. Second, I am not suggesting that even among that relatively 
uncommon species—the innovative entrepreneur—that preponderant focus is on anything that 
can reasonably be deemed breakthrough innovations. Here again, casual empiricism indicates the 
reverse—that the bulk of the novelties they introduce are only slightly better mousetraps. So it is 
not my claim that most entrepreneurs devote themselves to radical innovation or even to any 
innovation at all. Rather, I propose the converse: that among the (rare) innovations that can be   24
considered to be radical, a disproportionate share is provided by independent innovators and their 
affiliated entrepreneurs.  
  Thus, in what follows, I will have to account, first, for the comparative paucity of 
breakthroughs that emerge from the sizeable labs and affiliated facilities of the large, established 
and innovative firms. Second, I will have the task of explaining why a significant group of 
entrepreneurs and inventors, albeit a comparatively small one, are willing to undertake the great 
uncertainties and the typically enormous personal effort that pursuit of this objective requires. 
The issue is not why there are so many that do so, but why there is a significant set of these 
adventurers at all. 
 
 10: Superstar Market Reward Structure, or the Multimillion-Dollar Lottery 
The most obvious incentive to which one can attribute the relatively frequent focus of 
independent inventors and their entrepreneur partners upon more radical ideas is, of course, the 
great wealth and enormous prestige that success in their undertaking appears to promise. We all 
do, indeed, know of inventor-entrepreneurs who are enduring legends: Eli Whitney, James Watt, 
Elias Singer, Thomas Edison, the Wright Brothers, etc., etc. Indeed, it is striking how familiar 
they are. 
    There is an immediate consequence: The enormous prestige and great financial rewards, 
along with their rarity, transform the innovative entrepreneur's activities into a lottery that offers 
just a few mega-prizes, like so many of the lotteries that nowadays capture the headlines. An 
innovator’s activity is like such a mega-lottery, or like the pursuit of an occupation that offers a 
limited number of superstar positions. But the prize is available only to those who provide 
breakthrough innovations. A technological contribution that permits humanity to fly or to send 
messages through the air can elicit headlines, but a minor improvement in automobile door 
handles is hardly likely to compete. And just as multimillion-dollar lotteries have a greater 
attraction than a thousand-dollar lottery of the local club, even though the latter’s terms are better 
actuarially, the pursuit of breakthrough innovations surely has a very special attraction to the 
independent entrepreneur.   
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11: Monetary Compensation, Psychic Compensation 
A very well-recognized attribute of lotteries is their built-in unfairness, as measured in 
actuarial terms. The average payout is sure to be less than the per-ticket-holder take of the lottery 
operator—that is why he is in the business. We will see that there is a somewhat similar loss 
prospect for the representative entrepreneur. In part, the willingness of innovators, like the 
buyers of lottery tickets, to accept these biased terms is probably attributable to over-optimism or 
to sheer miscalculation. But that is hardly the end of the story. Each of these activities—
innovative entrepreneurship and the purchase of lottery tickets—also provides an important 
payoff of a second sort. Both activities offer distinct psychic rewards, and not only to those who 
have already achieved success or who even have a real and substantial likelihood of success. The 
prospects of glory, of wealth and fame, are something of value even if they never materialize. 
They are, indeed, the stuff that dreams are made of. And for the entrepreneur, contemplation of 
imagined success is only part of the psychic reward. Reading the biographies of the great 
inventors, one must be struck by the fascination that the process of their work elicited, by the 
moments of triumph, and even the pleasure of puzzle-solving and experimentation, though 
punctured by frustration and exhaustion. 
  These observations find support in some significant economic data. There is systematic 
evidence (see, e.g., Freeman, 1978) that the average earnings of self-employed individuals are 
significantly lower than those of employees with similar qualifications, and the same is 
presumably true, in particular, of the self-employed innovative entrepreneurs.    There are at 
least two studies that support this hypothesis for innovative entrepreneurs. Thomas Astebro 
(2003) reports on the basis of a sample of 1,091 inventions that, “The average IRR [internal rate 
of return] on a portfolio investment in these inventions is 11.4 percent. This is higher than the 
risk-free rate but lower than the long-run return on high-risk securities and the long-run return on 
early-stage venture capital funds…the distribution of return is skew; only between 7-9 percent 
reach the market. Of the 75 inventions that did, six received returns above 1400 percent, 60 
percent obtained negative returns and the median was negative (p. 226).” Perhaps even more 
striking is the recent work of Nordhaus (2004), who provides evidence showing how little of the 
efficiency rent goes to the innovator: “Using data from the U.S. non-farm business section, I 
estimate that innovators are able to capture about 2.2 percent of the total surplus from 
innovation. This number results from a low rate of initial appropriability (estimated to be around   26
7 percent) along with a high rate of depreciation of Schumpeterian profits (judged to be around 
20 percent per year)....the rate of profit on the replacement cost of capital over the 1948-2001 
period is estimated to be 0.19 percent per year” ( p. 34).
13    
  Perhaps even more striking and more extreme is the phenomenon of open sourcing and 
shareware in computer programming. Here, a great and growing body of complex and valuable 
material has been painstakingly created, and much of it is evidently of enormous value in 
economic and other terms. Yet it has been created and offered to others with modest, if any, 
restrictions, and without financial reward. Thus, a much noted and much valued activity is 
produced with a zero financial reward, a payoff evidently far below what the work could have 
elicited if performed inside an established business enterprise. But the enthusiasm of those 
involved seems equally manifest. 
  An explanation is readily available and follows immediately from the attributes of the 
activities that have just been noted. The representative entrepreneur may indeed be underpaid in 
terms of financial reward alone. But his total payoff may be closer to what economic theory 
would lead us to expect, though part of the payoff takes a form other than money. It is as though 
he were being paid off in two different currencies: partly in dollars, partly in euros. In 
equilibrium, such two-coin payment recipients could clearly expect fewer dollars than someone 
similarly engaged whose contract calls for payment only in that one currency.
14 That this is how 
markets work is easily confirmed by casual observation.   
  The story pertains not only to the entrepreneur. It recurs throughout the economy.   The 
fact that that multimillion-dollar lotteries are carefully and openly structured to be actuarially 
unfair means, as already noted, that the purchasers of tickets in such a lottery will on average and 
as a whole receive back less than they put into it. It is arguable that the masses of purchasers who 
endure long and time-consuming queues to grab up the tickets are not irrational but that they 
receive an adequate payment in another currency: the psychic rewards. That same scenario helps 
to explain, in an example from another arena, why despite the rigors of their training and the 
                                                 
13 Using a cruder and more-intuitive approach, the present author also reached a very low figure for the returns to 
innovation that are not dissipated in spillovers (see Baumol, 2002b, pp. 134-5). 
14 This suggests one way in which it may sometimes be possible to place a monetary value on psychological 
enjoyment and even esthetic pleasure. A similar situation has been noted in other arenas. For example, there are data 
showing that the average financial return to investment in works of art is significantly lower than the return to 
investment in bonds, the difference being interpreted as the financial valuation of the esthetic yield of painting 
ownership (see Frey and Pommerehne, 1989).    27
difficulties of their work, the typical earnings of professional dancers are so meager.
15 One can 
easily think of other occupations with similar attributes.   
  And the reason is not just sheer willingness of the recipient of psychic benefits to be 
exploited in financial terms. The market mechanism enforces it, as Adam Smith pointed out: 
Given two occupations, one very distasteful and the other a source of great pleasure, if other 
things including payoffs and ability requirements were equal, we must expect the workforce to 
shun the one and flock to the other, driving wages up in the former and depressing them in the 
latter as a garden-variety manifestation of supply and demand.
16 
 
12: Entrepreneurs’ Competitive Position and the Low Supply Cost of Psychic Benefits:  
      Outsourcing of Breakthroughs 
 
There is an important implication of this story whose relevance will become clear 
presently. So far we have not assigned a critical role of the market mechanism in eliciting 
disproportionate allocation of entrepreneurial activity to breakthrough innovation. We will now 
come to such a role of the market. Psychic benefits are a very tangible reward to the recipient but 
are generally costless to the provider. This implies that an innovative entrepreneur who on 
average receives great pleasure but meager financial rewards from the activity may nevertheless 
be richly rewarded overall. But the low financial payment means that innovations obtained from 
this source are purchased cheaply in financial terms, giving this sector of the economy a marked 
competitive advantage. That is, this analysis tells us that the independent innovative entrepreneur 
will tend to be the economical supplier of breakthrough innovation to the economy. As we know, 
one of the virtues of markets and competition is their ability to move economic activities toward 
those suppliers who can provide them most economically. In the case at hand, it means that the 
                                                 
15 Other areas where some element of non-pecuniary income is likely to exist include scientific research, academic 
occupations and perhaps professional work more generally. It may also arise among the self-employed in their 
enjoyment of freedom from control by superiors (Hamilton, 2000; Frey and Benz, 2003). This phenomenon and its 
relation to the work of innovators has long been recognized: “The knowledge of the man of science, indispensable as 
it is to the development of industry, circulates with ease and rapidity from one nation to all the rest. And men of 
science have themselves an interest in its diffusion; for upon that diffusion they rest their hopes of fortune, and, what 
is more prized by them, of reputation too” (J. B. Say, 1819, 1834, p. 82). 
16 “The wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the honourableness or 
dishonourableness of the employment…. A journeyman weaver earns less than a journeyman blacksmith.  His work 
is not always easier, but it is much cleanlier…The exorbitant rewards of players, opera-singers and opera-dances, 
&c. are founded upon these two principles: the rarity and beauty of the talents, and the discredit of employing them 
in this manner. It seems absurd at first that we should despise their person, and yet reward their talents with the most   28
low-cost psychic reward component of the independent innovator’s compensation will make it 
more economical for the large firm, in considering its make-or-buy options, more generally to 
acquire its breakthroughs from others rather than seeking to provide them in-house.
17 Firms are 
forced to do so for fear that if they do not, their rivals will. This, then, suggests one market-based 
reason (that is not mere happenstance) why a disproportionate share of radical innovation stems 
from the independent entrepreneur. 
  There is a second observation to be offered here. Why does this low-wage competitive 
advantage of the independent innovator-entrepreneur not extend also to the less radical 
innovations—the cumulative incremental improvements that are a giant firm specialty? At least 
part of the answer is the greater complexity and investment cost characteristic of the latter. A 
Boeing 777 is obviously far more complicated than the primitive device the Wright brothers 
made airborne at Kitty Hawk, and the transformation of the Boeing 747 into the Boeing 777 
entailed an army of engineers and designers and an expenditure that made the outlays of the 
Wrights dramatically insignificant by comparison. This, too, is not accidental. By its very nature, 
this revolutionary invention, like so many before it, grew ever more complex as it was repeatedly 
modified and improved. Thus, the independent innovator was and continues to be at a marked 
disadvantage in the financing of incremental improvements of inventions that have reached an 
advanced stage of sophistication.   
There is an important third reason for the large firms to outsource innovative activity that 
is targeted at breakthroughs, because that is a way of shifting the most extreme risks to the 
independent entrepreneur. Normally, one would think that it is the large firms that are in a better 
position to deal with risk than is the independent entrepreneur, because they are apt to have 
larger reserves to fall back on, and can afford simultaneously to undertake a number of projects, 
so that the law of large numbers would be on their side. But the evidence suggests that this is not 
enough to lead them to focus on revolutionary invention. 
Work on breakthrough ideas clearly is beset by great uncertainty. One probably has to 
have a touch of madness to devote most of one’s time and resources to the untried prospects that 
a breakthrough innovation unavoidably entails. But there is reason to suspect that the innovative 
                                                                                                                                                             
profuse liberality. While we do the one, however, we must of necessity do the other” (Smith, 1776, Book I, Chapter 
X, Part I).   29
entrepreneurs characteristically are self-selected risk lovers, that is, persons who attracted by the 
prospect of magnificent prizes, in disregard of the low probability of their attainment. This is a 
much more extreme type of predisposition than that of the lottery ticket buyer who, after all, 
risks little if the few tickets he purchases do not pay off. Rather, the inventor is apt to risk all, 
sometimes the welfare of his family, perhaps led on by the belief that success in his enterprise is 
not just a matter of chance, but depends on his own ability and persistence.  
The large firm, in contrast, is characteristically driven to seek to avoid risks or at least to 
minimize them, because failure in the innovation process can even threaten survival, and where 
entry is easy, profits and reserves are apt to be low, making it even more difficult to cover the 
cost of projects that prove disappointing.
18 The bottom line is that market forces drive the large 
innovative firms to risk-avoidance to the extent this is permitted by innovative activity, and this, 
too, forces them toward focus on incremental activity, leaving the enormously risky pursuit of 
breakthroughs to the independent inventor and his entrepreneur partner. We can sum this up in 
 
Proposition 4. Market-Driven Assignment of the Tasks of Innovation.  
The assignment of a large share of breakthrough innovations to independent inventors 
and entrepreneurs and of incremental improvement to large firms is driven by market forces such 
as the effects of psychic rewards on financial costs, the high investment cost of incremental 
improvements, and the relative risk-bearing propensities of the two groups. 
 
  There seems to be no reason to expect the market forces just described to be very 
transitory. If they are indeed enduring, it follows that we can expect the current division of 
innovative labor between small and large firms to continue. There is also no reason to believe 
that this will be damaging to the public interest.    
 
                                                                                                                                                             
17 It is also possible that independent entrepreneurs who happen to care only about monetary payout will choose to 
purchase intellectual property for the low price demanded by the inventory. Such transactions probably do occur, 
perhaps not infrequently. However, that does not exclude the large high-tech firm from this activity. 
18 “In established businesses, innovation is mostly shaped through small, incremental steps of additional features to 
augment basic functionalities. With short product lifecycles, time to recoup R&D investments is limited…. Success 
is relatively predictable through the execution of well-defined innovation processes and in-depth knowledge of their 
markets in the respective business units” (A. Huijser, Ph.D., executive vice president and chief technology officer, 
Royal Phillips Electronics, The Hague, September 2003).  
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13: On the Longer-Run Supply of Innovative Entrepreneurship 
  In seeking to determine whether we can treat the innovative entrepreneur as the 
theoretical literature treats other factors of production, we should say something about the supply 
and demand conditions in the market for entrepreneurial activity. Because we are focusing on 
self-employed inventors and entrepreneurs, the demand function is not a concept that is directly 
applicable. However, as I will argue next, the structure of supply in this market is observable and 
distinctive. Here it may be noted that the special attributes of supply rather than demand are 
focused upon throughout basic distribution theory. The distinctive supply conditions of the 
different factors of production are often employed as the primary attribute that distinguishes one 
from another. Land is fixed in supply. Physical capital is a produced good so that the profit 
calculation determines its quantity, while the supply of labor is largely determined exogenously. 
In contrast, at least in marginal productivity theory, there is virtually no difference among the 
factors in the way their demands are determined.   
Analogously looking at the market for entrepreneurial activity from the supply side does 
permit some interesting observations, observations that seem firmly based in clear historical 
evidence, but which have apparently not yet achieved general recognition. 
In the nonmathematical growth literature, it has often been asserted that the appearance of an 
abundant supply of entrepreneurs effectively stimulates growth, while shrinkage in the 
economy's cadre of entrepreneurs becomes a significant impediment to growth. But those 
apparently vital phenomena—the appearance and disappearance of the entrepreneurs—were left 
as a great mystery, with hints that they hang on cultural developments in the economy and 
changes in other psychological and sociological influences, more or less vague in character. 
But, as described earlier, review of the historical evidence suggests an alternative 
explanation, less magical or science fictional in character. An alternative scenario holds that the 
entrepreneurs do not suddenly appear from nowhere or just as mysteriously begin to vanish. 
Rather, in this scenario the entrepreneurs are always with us, but as the structure of the rewards 
offered in the economy change, they switch the locus of their activity, moving into the arenas 
where the payoff prospects have become most attractive. And in doing so, they move in and out 
of the activities that are most generally recognized as entrepreneurial and productive, exchanging 
them with other activities that also require considerable enterprising talent but are often quite 
distant from the production of goods and services. And when institutions have changed so as to   31
modify profoundly the relative payoffs offered by the different enterprising activities, the supply 
of entrepreneurs has shifted accordingly from the now less-rewarding to the more-rewarding 
activities. Just as technological change led workers and engineers to reallocate themselves from 
canal building to railroad construction, and then on to still more modern enterprises, the 
entrepreneurs have also reallocated themselves in accord with changes in the structure of payoffs 
to the different occupations. Thus, once we recognize that entrepreneurial talent can be driven to 
reallocate itself from one category to another it becomes clear that when there is a pertinent 
change in the institutions that govern the relative rewards, the entrepreneurs will be induced to 
shift their activities among the affected fields of endeavor and so the set of productive 
entrepreneurs will appear to expand or contract autonomously. Thus, when institutions change to 
prohibit private armies and to create a national military force capable of making this effective, as 
happened in Europe between the end of the Middle Ages and the Industrial Revolution, the 
rewards offered by creative operation of private military forces are reduced, and entrepreneurs 
will be led to look elsewhere to realize their financial ambitions. If, simultaneously, rules against 
confiscation of private property and for patent protection of inventions are adopted as happened 
in England in about the same period, this will lead those with entrepreneurial talent to shift their 
efforts into productive and indeed innovative directions. In sum, we have: 
 
Proposition 5.   
Entrepreneurship is a resource that is subject to reallocation between productive and 
unproductive activities. The supply of productive entrepreneurs is heavily influenced by the 
institutional arrangements that determine the relative payoffs to the two types of activity.
19 
That is the essence of the supply-side of the theory of entrepreneurship. 
 
14: Conclusion: Notes on the Value Microtheory of Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
All of the preceding discussion is directly pertinent to the construction of a model that 
can determine the prices of the services of entrepreneurs, independent inventors, and the large 
                                                 
19 The role of institutions in influencing the supply of entrepreneurs is, of course, not new, and has been emphasized 
by a number of authors, notably Douglas North.  What may be new about Proposition 5 is the assertion that 
institutional changes do not do this primarily by inducing creation of a body of new entrepreneurs where there were 
few before, but by enticing enterprising individuals away from their previous unproductive activities and leading 
them to transfer to productive undertakings.   32
firms with substantial R&D activities. With entry into innovative activities largely unobstructed, 
and the big firms driven by an innovative arms race to constantly repeated investment in the 
innovation process, we conclude from our analysis that they will driven toward normal profits on 
their R&D outlays, although the quest for survival will prevent them from abandoning the 
activity. Moreover, given the low marginal cost of use of the resulting information, they will be 
forced to adopt the market-determined discriminatory prices that maximize their profits in order 
to recoup their R&D investments. Third, by Proposition 3, those prices will tend to be Pareto 
optimal. 
I have argued that a very similar story can be told about the independent entrepreneurs 
and inventors. Although it may at first not be obvious, this is precisely what the Schumpeterian 
scenario already has told us, only it has done so in a manner that disguises the price 
discrimination side of the story, which almost precisely follows that just offered for the large 
established enterprises. But what is entailed in Schumpeter can be better described as 
intertemporal price discrimination. The entrepreneur and inventor recoup their outlays of money 
and effort in the initial period after the introduction of an innovation when competition is weak 
or nonexistent, so the seller’s demand curve is inelastic and the profit-maximizing price is high. 
But as imitators appear, the initial seller’s demand curve grows more elastic and that price 
consequently falls. The remainder of the story is clearly well-known. 
  These constructs seem to represent progress toward the restoration of the entrepreneurs to 
their rightful place in value theory—to making them visible, once again, as they evidently need 
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